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    Research Paper no. 1/07 
 
COORDINATING SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS: 
RHETORIC AND REALITY 
 
Abstract 
Two reciprocally interdependent, dyadic supply relationships – one inter-organizational, 
the other intra-organizational - were investigated across a broad front in this study.  The 
focus was on the logistics relationship between supply partners, and on how these 
relationships were co-ordinated in practice.  We probed co-ordination between the 
partners using four constructs – goal congruence, information sharing, co-ordination 
mechanisms and joint decision making.  Based on these two studies, we propose that the 
process of mutual adjustment creates a ‘together-separate’ tension that has to be managed 
in practice.  This process may lead to the development of new capabilities that transcend 
the boundaries of the firm: equally, it is a fragile process that may be thrown into reverse 
by a variety of factors such as people turnover and failure to maintain established co-
ordination mechanisms. 
 
Keywords: Supply relationships, Logistics, Coordination 
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1. Introduction  
The notion of the supply chain as a network of processes fits comfortably with the 
operations management (OM) principle of transforming raw materials and information 
into products and services which are valued by end customers. The network can be 
viewed as an ‘extended enterprise’, a group of strategically aligned companies focused on 
specific market opportunities (Greis and Kasarda, 1997) by exploiting collective 
capabilities. The term ‘enterprise logistics’ (from an earlier version by Wolfe, 1990) was 
proposed as a concept for integrating logistics activities within and between the 
transformation processes of the extended enterprise. In their study of fit between 
enterprise logistics capabilities and supply chain structure, Stock et al (2000) argue that a 
‘new and expanded role for logistics will be required in the new extended manufacturing 
enterprise’.   This new role ‘will place high priority on both inter-firm and intra-firm 
integration of logistics activities’. Such considerations have led scholars to consider how 
the new structures should be configured and coordinated (for example, Rudberg and 
Olhager, 2003.  Authors such as Speckman et al (1998) and Barringer and Harrison 
(2000) call for a clearer understanding of the practices that facilitate the operation of 
logistics activities between parts of a multi-national firm, or between members of a 
network that are implicit in the ‘single entity’ view of the extended enterprise.  
While terms such as extended enterprise and supply network are still in need of clearer 
construct development, the challenge is to design and manage ‘a network of 
interdependent relationships developed and fostered through strategic collaboration’ 
(Chen and Paulraj, 2004).  Two of the key factors in developing interdependent 
relationships between buyer and supplier dyads are reducing the number of suppliers, and 
developing long term relationships with the chosen few.   As an example of such 
interdependence, Carillo (2004) describes the evolution of GM and Delphi Automotive 
Systems (a GM spin-off specializing in parts and components, now re-named as Delphi) 
in Mexico.  The Mexican operation has been a subset of GM’s global policy of 
externalizing auto parts and subassemblies, and maintaining final assembly and the 
production of engines in-house.  It has also reflected GM’s policy of maintaining fewer 
but more closely integrated suppliers, replicated down the supply chain.  Evolution of the 
relationship has created ‘third generation’ plants which can innovate in products and 
processes, and which are globally competitive on costs and quality.  It has also created a 
situation where the two organizations are vulnerable to each other’s wider problems (see 
for example Welch and Henry, 2005). 
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There are, however, few empirical studies of closely interdependent supply relationships 
in the academic literature.  Most scholars have viewed interdependence from a theoretical 
perspective (Thompson, 1969; Richardson, 1972; Borys and Jemison, 1989), thus leaving 
a gap in our understanding of the reality of the detail of these complex processes.  The 
need for internal consistency has been widely commented on, largely in disciplines other 
than OM.  For example the ‘typology of organisations’ (Adler and Borys, 1996:78) 
proposes a ‘fit’ between the type of formalisation (enabling or coercive) and the relative 
routineness of the task.  Other studies of internal consistency develop the argument for 
‘bundles’ of HR practices (McDuffie, 1995), or for human resource management (HRM) 
systems (Becker and Huselid, 1998).  Studies on external consistency are less common.  
However empirical evidence concerning HRM issues within inter-organisational 
relationships has begun to emerge (Hunter et al, 1996; Scarbrough, 2000; Rubery et al, 
2004).   So far, these studies of interdependence have looked at the relationship from the 
perspective of only one organization.   
Our interests in exploring the extended enterprise led us to select dyadic supply 
relationships as our units of analysis.  By taking a logistics perspective, we conducted 
empirical studies to probe the co-ordination of two such relationships that had developed 
around the physical flow of materials and associated exchange of information.  We 
sought to identify and to compare the co-ordination of supply relationships in 
organizational terms in interdependent supply contexts.  We operationalised our aims by 
directly studying in depth (Langley, 1999) both sides of two dyadic supply relationships.   
The first was between separately (US-) owned partners in the chemical industry in the 
UK, the second between French and English units of a French-owned pharmaceutical 
firm that worked on different stages in the manufacture of a drug. 
Our article is divided into four further parts. First, we review the co-ordination of supply 
relationships; second, we explain our research methodology; third, the backgrounds of 
each case are presented together with findings from the cross case analysis.  Finally, 
conclusions of the study are made, and avenues for future research identified. 
2. Co-ordinating supply relationships 
Adapting Quinn and Dutton’s (2005) definition, co-ordination is ‘the process people use 
to create, adapt, and re-create [supply relationships]’.  Thereby, ‘people arrange actions in 
ways that they believe will enable them to accomplish their goals’.   This definition helps 
draw out the role of organizational factors (such as congruent goals and information 
sharing) in the co-ordination process.  Lack of co-ordination in supply relationships or 
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‘rules of the road’ means that ‘everyone will be interfering in the plans of others’ (Sen 
and Sekaran, 1998). The role of co-ordination in supply chain integration tactics has been 
developed from a logistics perspective by Frohlich and Westbrook (2001).  They identify 
two types of integration, the first of which is ‘co-ordinating the forward physical flow of 
deliveries between suppliers, manufacturers and customers’.  The second type of 
integration involves ‘the backward co-ordination of information technology and the flow 
of data from customers to suppliers’. However, their ‘arc of integration’ does not attempt 
to address how relationships are co-ordinated in practice, and their views of integration 
remain at the level of sequential interdependence, a point we next address. 
Thompson (1967) defines co-ordination in terms of the protocols, tasks and decision 
mechanisms designed to achieve concerted actions between interdependent organisational 
units (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996).  He identifies three ways in which units may be 
dependent on one another.  The first is pooled interdependence, whereby units share and 
use common resources but are otherwise independent.  An example is shared use of a 
third party logistics service provider’s distribution centre and transportation network by a 
number of otherwise independent users.  Second is sequential interdependence, where 
units work in series and the output from one becomes the input to the next.  An example 
is the supply of salt to the state of Minnesota for gritting roads in winter.  Third is 
reciprocal interdependence, in which the outputs of each become the inputs for the 
others.  Each unit poses contingency for the other, and co-ordination takes place by 
mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967:54-56).  An example is the GM-Delphi relationship 
we referred to earlier.  ‘Increasingly heavy burdens’ are placed on information sharing 
and decision making in moving from pooled to sequential to reciprocal situations. 
Sequential interdependence describes the traditional, unidirectional logistics view of 
buyer-supplier co-ordination (source→make→deliver). Reciprocal interdependence 
describes bi-directional logistics co-ordination (source ⇔ make ⇔ deliver).  
Reciprocal interdependence requires the most elaborate form of exchange (Thompson, 
1967; Richardson, 1972). Such exchanges are characteristic of firms that have established 
long term relationships (Gadde and Snehota, 1995), and which require mutually 
beneficial adaptation of existing structures (Richardson, 1972; Hallen et al, 1991). Such 
inter-firm relationships exhibit sunk assets (high specificity), frequent transactions and 
uncertain contexts (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), which would normally fall under 
hierarchical governance modes. This context is clearly different from the ‘arm’s length’ 
type of relationship where the principal information shared is price and what is purchased 
(Powell, 1991; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
From a logistics perspective, the challenge is to co-ordinate a wide range of types of 
business process (such as manufacture, distribute and sell) across supply networks.   The 
challenge can be subdivided into intra- and inter-company aspects.  Thus, Romano (2003) 
states ‘the concept of integration as a mechanism to support business processes across a 
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supply network is closely related with the effort to overcome intra- and inter-
organisational boundaries’.  We review each of these aspects in turn. 
2.1. Intra-firm co-ordination 
Internal integration has typically been viewed from three angles.  These are (1) functional 
integration (Stock et al, 2000, Pagell, 2004); (2) the complexity of managing 
decentralised organisation structures in as much as sites often have to work together to 
deliver product, while reporting to different divisions or business units within the 
corporation (Lee and Billington, 1993); and (3) design-process integration practices like 
concurrent engineering, design for manufacturability and standardization (Droge et al, 
2004).  Pagell’s (2004) model of functional integration between operations, purchasing 
and logistics proposes a complex phenomenon driven by a number of factors including 
the structure and culture at the plant, reward systems and the amount of formal and 
informal communication across the functions.  He found no distinction between single 
and multiple plant systems, although the small sample size (11 plants) meant this was an 
uncertain conclusion.  Pagell’s study centres on closely-related functions: further 
distortion to intra-firm co-ordination can be caused by functions that have more distant 
relationships.  For example, Hill (2000:26) has referred to lack of integration between 
marketing and operations as ‘the great business divide’.   
Most authors argue that internal co-ordination is the essential pre-cursor to external co-
ordination (for example, Romano, 2003).  But internal divisional boundaries are often 
inhibitors to the flow of materials and information as much as are boundaries with 
external supply partners.  Multidivisional corporations often decentralise control over 
internal buyer-supplier relationships and adopt market-like incentives to govern 
interdivisional supply relationships (Lee and Whang, 1999; Walker and Poppo, 1991). 
Thus, co-ordination within divisions can be favoured over co-ordination between them 
and relationships with external suppliers are found easier to manage than internal 
relationships (Eccles and White, 1988; Walker and Poppo, 1991). 
2.2. Inter-firm co-ordination 
Many firms have been dismantling their vertically integrated supply structures because 
they are too slow to respond to market changes and too costly.  For example, most 
automotive assemblers and aerospace prime manufacturers have greatly reduced the 
number of direct suppliers by appointing logistics integrators who take over responsibility 
for a whole family of parts and the associated operational complexity of planning and 
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controlling them.  Interdependence among members of the supply network increases 
accordingly:  the most critical element ‘is the adaptation of the competitive behavior of 
individual supply network members to a joint regime’ (Romano, 2003).  Being a good 
partner in a network has ‘become a key corporate asset’ (Kanter, 1994).  And Droge et al 
(2004) use constructs of supplier development, supplier partnering and closer customer 
relationships in developing their view of strategic inter-firm integration. Such constructs 
model a view of integration between firms across a broad front characterized by 
reciprocal interdependence. 
Breaking up centralized supply structures has created new challenges for integrating the 
flow of information and materials, such as developing the capabilities of the integrators to 
manage the expanded co-ordination tasks.  Kumar and van Dissel (1996) propose that the 
structure of inter-firm relationships develops according to the level of pre-specification of 
co-ordination mechanisms, a view supported by Romano (2003). 
3. Analyzing supply relationships 
In exploring inter-organizational relationships, we are confronted by the huge size of the 
literature (for example, Barringer and Harrison, 2000), and by the broad spectrum of 
methods that have been used to research them.   Tackling this problem from a strategy 
perspective, Dyer and Singh (1998) refer to two prominent views of gaining superior 
returns from inter-organizational relationships.  First is the industry structure view, where 
a firm may be embedded in an industry with favorable structural characteristics.  Second 
is the resource based view (RBV), where a firm may accumulate resources and 
capabilities that are scarce or difficult to imitate.  They also propose a third – the 
relational view –  where the (dis)advantages of a firm are linked to the (dis)advantages of 
the network of relationships in which it is embedded.  This view, which we adopted in 
our study, focuses on the dyad [/network] routines and processes as the unit of analysis.  
Support for the relational view comes from Sobrero and Schrader (1998), who argue that 
the single relationship rather than a firm or set of firms should be the unit of analysis.  We 
focused on the logistics relationship between supply partners, again narrowing the field of 
multiple relationships between the same partners.   
Using the 5-stage research process model of Stuart et al (2002), we set out to undertake 
our study of supply relationships by considering dimensions across a broad front so that 
we could engage with the multi-faceted nature of these relationships in practice. 
Following other scholars such as Jap (1999) and Chen and Paulraj (2004), we directed 
our attention to the buyer-supplier dyadic relationship in order to focus on co-ordination 
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in the context of reciprocal interdependence.  We identified the following research 
question: 
How does co-ordination work within the context of reciprocally interdependent supply 
relationships? 
Based on our review of coordinating supply relationships in section 2 above, we selected 
four organizational factors that have often been used to describe the buyer-supplier co-
ordination process: goal congruence, information sharing, co-ordination mechanisms and 
decision making.  While these are by no means exhaustive, our aim was to develop a 
framework for analysis that enabled us to probe the co-ordination process across a broad 
front.   
We selected case study methodology as our research strategy in order to facilitate 
understanding of the selected organisational factors in the context of supply relationships.  
This involved developing a clear definition of the unit of analysis in terms of the 
‘relationship’ (see section 3 above), its organisational specification (the team or group of 
employees who interacted within ‘the relationship’), its physical location (the 
manufacturing units where the main activities pertaining to the relationship took place), 
and its temporal extent. 
3.1. Sample selection 
Two organizations were selected opportunistically to provide the detailed and broad-
based access needed to conduct our enquiries.  Both featured supply relationships 
involving large, multi-national companies that could be described as highly 
interdependent and long term in nature.  The first case was based on the inter-firm 
relationship between two organisations in the chemical industry which we call ‘Wheatco’ 
and ‘Chemco’.  While both were US-owned, Wheatco and Chemco were physically 
situated next to each other on a site in the UK.  The second case was based on an intra-
firm supply relationship between the drug manufacturing and finishing divisions of a 
pharmaceutical organization we call ‘Tyrenco’, which were situated in France and the 
UK respectively.  Both cases were set in highly proceduralised, chemical industry 
environments. Both could be described as reciprocally interdependent supply 
relationships.  Both logistics relationships were under pressure as a result of recurrent 
technical problems. We studied Chemco/Wheatco and Tyrenco for consecutive, nine-
month periods.  Brief contextual details are provided in the next section.   
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3.2. Contexts and Units of Analysis  
In this section, we summarise the operating contexts of the supply dyads, and explain 
how we arrived at the specification of the units of analysis. 
3.2.1. Wheatco-Chemco  
Wheatco and Chemco are two US chemical corporations, both leaders in their chosen 
fields and with similar sales (around $2bn). Ten years prior to our study, the two 
companies formed a partnership with the strategic objective of gaining competitive 
advantage through mutual access to low-cost raw materials. One outcome was the 
establishment in the UK of a small Chemco facility (70 employees) which was 
sandwiched between two of the units within a large Wheatco plant (700 employees).  
While a fence divided the two plants, selected employees were able to pass between the 
two by means of swipe card access. A Chemco manager commented: 
“We are symbiotically linked.  If you take away the Chemco and Wheatco 
 signs,  we’re really one site…we have a relationship and it’s an umbilical 
cord.” 
Chemco was dedicated to production of a chemical additive used in the production of 
rubbers, paints and other compositions.  The feedstock used in the Chemco process was 
supplied by the Wheatco ‘Basics’ unit.  The manufacturing process of the additive 
generated a gaseous by-product, which was recycled back into the Wheatco feedstock.  
Half of the additive made on the Chemco site was sold to Wheatco’s ‘Rubber’ unit, and 
the rest to other customers in Europe and the USA. The two firms thereby formed a 
‘closed loop’ supply chain, whereby they were customer of, and supplier to, each other.  
The production processes operated on a round-the-clock basis and there was very little 
buffer stock within the supply loop. This close interdependence of the processes meant 
that the operating teams were in contact on a 24-hour basis. There was a direct telephone 
link between Wheatco and Chemco, colloquially referred to with typical Anglo Saxon 
humour as the ‘Batphone’, which allowed easy communication and warning of any 
problems or schedule changes to either of the processes - or to inform of forthcoming 
production shutdowns. 
Figure 1 shows how we defined the unit of analysis based on material and information 
flows between the two organizations for the additive described above. 
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Figure 1: Bounding the unit of analysis: the Wheatco-Chemco supply relationship 
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The logistics relationship was multifaceted, with interactions taking place at many levels. 
In the USA headquarters of both firms, an executive contact was appointed to manage the 
relationship at a strategic level, especially in regard to the global contract agreement. This 
provided the commercial terms for the relationship. Locally, the interactions included 
plant management, engineers and operators. A joint Steering Committee determined the 
local operational strategy for the relationship and provided guidelines to two other joint 
teams: quality improvement and technical. 
3.2.2 Tyrenco Paris and London  
The result of a recent merger, Tyrenco ranked among world leaders in the discovery, 
development and marketing of innovative pharmaceutical products.  In 2000, Tyrenco 
launched a supply chain initiative called ‘SPAN’, aimed at improving the supply chain 
processes of its leading products. The program emphasized three priorities: new 
processes, new technology and organizational alignment. This third aspect aimed at 
improving integration within Industrial Operations between ‘Active Product Ingredient’ 
(API) manufacture (the upstream chemicals business) and ‘Drug Products’ (DP - the 
downstream pharmaceutical operations).  Figure 2 shows the API and DP reporting 
relationships, together with the respective London and Paris manufacturing sites:  
 
Figure 2: Tyrenco Industrial Operations organisation chart
HEAD OF
INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS
VP Industrial 
Technology
VP Human resources
& communication
VP Quality
Operations & EHS
VP API Operations
VP DP Operations
Europe, Africa
Middle Ease
VP DP Operations
America, Asia,
Pacific
VP Supply
Chain
VP Purchasing
VP Controlling
API- O France
Paris
Site
London 
Site
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We focused on the logistics relationship between the API site in Paris and the DP site in 
London.  This relationship centred on the manufacture of T-drug, one of Tyrenco’s 
strategic products used in the treatment of breast cancer. Manufacturing of the active 
ingredient, D-Synth, took place in Paris. This intermediate was then shipped partly to 
London and partly to the T-drug unit in Paris. Manufacture of the T-drug solution was 
dual-sourced between Paris and London, while the final production steps, together with 
inspection and packaging, were only performed in London.  In parallel with the SPAN 
initiative, a ‘mother plant’ initiative dealt with the regulatory and quality issues between 
the two sites.  In the case of T drug, London was made responsible for documentation, 
traceability and technical data exchange.  A Paris manager commented: 
“The commercialised drug product is made by London, Paris is a 
contributor to the manufacturing of this drug product.  So the relationship 
is de facto.” 
The two sites reported to different regional heads (the VP’s of API France and of DP 
EMEA respectively) and worked separately from each other. However, the introduction 
of SPAN sought to align the two sites as key owners of the strategic T-drug supply chain, 
thus forging closer links amongst a wider range of managers and employees across the 
two sites. 
Figure 3 shows how we defined the unit of analysis based on material and information 
flows between the two sites. 
3.3. Interview protocol 
A feature of the research design was semi-structured interviews with a wide cross section 
of employees and managers within each of the two dyads (48 in one and 36 in the other). 
The aim was to collect data, which was ‘pluralist’, hence describing competing versions 
of reality (Pettigrew, 1990). We sought to adopt a multi-perspective approach, and to 
avoid ‘elite-bias’ by drawing on the perspective of informants at different levels in the 
relationships studied.  These levels included operators, process engineers, and local and 
corporate management, as shown in Table 1: 
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Figure 3: Bounding the unit of analysis: Mapping the Tyrenco Paris-London supply 
relationship 
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Table 1: Informants for both cases 
 
 Wheatco Chemco Total 
Operators 3 4 7 
Engineers 8 10 18 
Management 6 3 9 
Corporate 1 1 2 
Total 18 18 36 
 Tyrenco Paris Tyrenco London  
Operators 2 3 5 
Engineers 1 6 7 
Management 7 7 14 
Corporate 1 3 4 
Total 11 19 30 
 
The rationale for the choice of informants was to have a broad range of interviewees from 
each of the units involved in the supply relationships, as well as broad functional 
representation across levels. The approach was to start with key managers in charge of 
the relationship and to follow leads from these initial interviews. Especially revealing 
were the views of corresponding informants on the other ‘side’ of a relationship.  One of 
us is bilingual in English and French. 
The main wave of data collection was complemented with subsequent interviews in order 
to check evidence through ‘peripheral sampling’, or to gather new knowledge on the way 
some individuals saw the relationship evolve over the course of the research.  Interviews 
with corporate informants provided an alternative perspective on the local situation whilst 
allowing a view of the case from interconnected levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1990).  
Interviews began with an introductory phase, where key objectives of the research were 
explained.  The informant’s role in the relationship was then discussed, together with his 
interface with the other firm.  The next stage of the interview centred on the informant’s 
perceptions about characteristics of the supply relationship.  Finally we explored 
perceptions about the co-ordination of the supply relationship and the 4 factors we used 
to characterise it.  The interview guide we used in our research is shown in appendix 1.   
The length and protocol for conducting interviews evolved over the course of the 
research. Interviews tended to be rather informal and longer (from 2 to 3 hours), in the 
early stages to provide an in-depth understanding of the research settings.  During later 
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stages, they were more focused and structured in order to provide specific additional 
evidence or to verify earlier research findings (Pitman and Maxwell, 1992).   
3.4. Other data sources 
The study drew on other sources such as documentation and observation. Some 
documents, such as joint meeting minutes or contract agreements were directly relevant 
to the topic of the study. Others, such as company brochures or organization charts 
pertained to the context at company or site level.  Each study took place over a 9-month 
period, which permitted the achievement of familiarity with the setting whilst not 
becoming over-involved (Pettigrew, 1990); this also allowed us to capture longitudinal 
aspects of the relationships.   
3.5. Quality in research design 
Rigor in case study design was addressed by Yin’s (2003) four tests.  Construct validity 
was sought by drawing on multiple sources of evidence for each case. Further, a report of 
our observations and conclusions was provided to each organization.  Findings were also 
presented to key informants in order to confirm the observations we had made.  Internal 
validity was sought by using the ‘relationship’ as a common construct to determine the 
units of analysis. Using similar research instruments across both cases facilitated cross-
case comparisons.  Replication logic guided the execution of the second case. The 
comparison with theory provided the basis for analytical generalization in order to link 
the conclusions to other theoretical views (external validity).  Finally, reliability was 
sought by using a protocol to guide data collation and analysis.  N’Vivo® software 
(Gibbs, 2002) provided an electronic database and analytical capability that was 
complemented by other documentary evidence in paper form. 
4. Within-Case Analysis  
We present in this section our findings from the four organizational factors, for the two 
relationships studied.  We refer to the Wheatco⇔Chemco relationship as Wh⇔Ch, and 
the Tyrenco Paris⇔London relationship as TyP⇔L.  
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4.1. Goal Congruence 
The study of goals within both supply relationships showed that they were stratified along 
three levels: strategic, operational and site goals. Strategic goals were linked into the high 
level key result areas at corporate level, operational goals measured the performance of 
the local supply relationship and site goals were the drivers for the performance 
management system.  
4.1.1. Wheatco⇔Chemco 
Within Wh⇔Ch, no explicit strategic goals were articulated as a high-level mission to 
guide the local relationship: 
“Nowhere have I seen this high level mission.  I had to find out about this 
relationship by practicing it, by having the meetings, by having the 
discussions, by finding out about how the relationship worked” (Chemco 
manager). 
This meant that learning about the relationship was derived from tacit, rather than explicit 
knowledge.  However, there was a clear vision of the shared local operational goals, 
which were articulated around process reliability (online time), product quality and 
supply. The objectives were articulated within the technical and quality teams (QIT) and 
we saw evidence that these goals were translated into individual employees’ performance 
objectives.  
Whilst the local relationship required goal sharing in order to be able to operate, this did 
not preclude the fact that there was a feeling of separateness and a concern for the benefit 
of the ‘home company’. 
“Where ultimately our only interest is what is best for Chemco. I still 
wonder whether everything that we do really benefits Chemco or not” 
(Chemco engineer) “They are maybe more keen in looking after their own 
needs” (Wheatco engineer) “Sometimes we think that they don’t do as 
much as we do.” (Wheatco management) 
One difference with regards to goal setting at both firms was that, whilst the Chemco site 
goals had a direct link into the relationship goals, this was not the case for Wheatco. 
Here, the variable compensation plan was based (beside corporate criteria) on the whole 
site performance, rather than on that of individual manufacturing units. This generated a 
perception of imbalance, especially at shop floor level. A Chemco engineer commented: 
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“They’ve had a terrible year and still got good recognition.  It doesn’t 
motivate them to succeed, does it?” 
4.1.2. Tyrenco Paris⇔London 
Tyrenco informants viewed their top-level goals, embodied in the strategic product line 
and cancer application, as impetus for joint work between the two sites. Conversely, 
informants agreed that there was a lack of joint operational goals. The key reason for 
separation of the two sites was organisational.  As described above, the reporting 
relationships of the two sites was to separate divisions.   
“In the TyP⇔L relationship, you have API France vs DP EMEA. So you 
have two boundaries there” (Paris Management). 
There was a perception of conflict in that success in achieving one site goal - for example 
budget or inventory - could come about at the expense of the other site. For example, the 
measurement of inventories was not at overall supply chain level, there was a tendency to 
overlook the logistics logic:  
“What are the forecasts, the needs, what are the product cycle times and 
the buffer stocks and this is valued in order to follow a financial logic: we 
end up managing inter-company margins rather than inventories” 
(Corporate manager). 
Thus financial issues were at the core of the inter-site rivalry. A London manager stated: 
“When the subject of individual site budgets and budgeting control comes 
up, then that’s a big issue and that’s where there is a kind of war zone 
area. The way those monies are controlled across the sites is in direct 
conflict.” 
4.2. Information sharing 
Information sharing was at two levels: technical information that needed to be shared in 
order to jointly resolve quality issues, and information pertaining to logistics and process 
co-ordination. 
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4.2.1. Wheatco⇔Chemco 
Overall, information appeared to flow openly and freely within the Wh⇔Ch relationship. 
The flow of information was secured through an agreement of confidentiality and non-
use, which was included in the contract and bound both firms and their employees: 
“I don’t think you can have a relationship like ours and not have that kind 
of sharing and openness with each other” (Chemco Management).  
There was limited clarity as to where to draw the line on information sharing.  Openness 
had also to do with being open about what could not be shared. There was little in the 
way of formal guidelines in regard to how much information should flow between the 
two plants. This was perceived by some informants as missing, especially because there 
was a culture (particularly at Wheatco) of being very private and secretive about the 
technology. Such boundaries were lessened to some extent because some socialisation 
was allowed at operator level, who “say what’s on their mind” (Wheatco management). 
We observed the impact of several quality problems, which helped foster more extended 
communication within the relationship as they prompted more interaction. 
“We’ve had some difficult problems to solve which has perhaps meant 
that we have had a lot more communication… that’s accelerated the 
process of getting to know each other” (Wheatco engineer).  
Centred on timely co-ordination of the joint manufacturing process, the procedural co-
ordination took several forms, imposing varying degrees of formality on to the daily 
operations.  These included complaints, forms and specifications:  
“a little bit more defined in terms of why are you rubbish or you’re not as 
good as you were” (Wheatco engineer). 
Defining the communication lines was deemed necessary in view of the broad interface 
between the three manufacturing units, which could induce a distortion of the information 
flow and reduce its efficiency. Structuring the communication lines was achieved through 
a communication protocol:  
“Increased breakdown events have revealed weaknesses in our systems: 
this e-mail is meant to bring clarity to this situation - who should call who 
and in what circumstances” (Chemco Operations Manager) 
Defining a new communication protocol entailed communicating information on the 
internal work structure, such as telephone lists and organisation charts.  Here we have an 
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example of the adjustment process and the ‘increased burdens’ placed on 
communications referred to by Thompson (see section 2 above). 
Inability to work with people face-to-face was perceived as hindering information 
sharing. Indeed, indirect modes of communication such as telephone or e-mail were 
perceived as making information sharing more difficult than direct face-to-face 
interaction. Here is how it was illustrated: 
“I’d like to see Wheatco come in over here, I’d like to see us going back 
over there regularly. Sometimes you’ve got to spell it out what impact, say, 
our chemical additive is having on their rubber manufacture” (Chemco 
engineer).  
4.2.2. Tyrenco Paris⇔London 
Several informants described information sharing within the TyP⇔L relationship as 
lacking transparency. This seemed to prevail in particular among Paris informants: 
 “We suffer from a lack of reactivity, of transparency, of clarity. We 
always get evasive responses, no yes or no (Paris management) It’s really 
difficult for us to understand what’s going on over there. For us it is very 
opaque” (Paris management). 
Indeed, data such as T-drug production schedules, sales forecasts and batch result data 
were necessary for the Paris manufacturing units to operate smoothly. From London there 
was recognition that information was ‘requested rather than given’ (London engineer). 
One explanation was that the relationship involved multiple levels of interaction, but 
relied on few strong contact points. In particular, there was a lack of functional 
interaction between the two manufacturing units.  
“What we haven’t done effectively or consistently is get involved jointly 
the people who actually run the process” (London management)  
Other perceived effects were potential delays or missed opportunities for joint problem 
solving:  
“You need to take the action away so if someone from production was 
there the issue could probably get resolved there and then” (London 
engineering).  
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Lack of interaction appeared to drive the lack of this ‘natural’ inclination to 
communicate. The lack of communication was enhanced by the separate organisation 
structure we have already referred to.  
Most informants agreed that the recent T-drug crisis had positively improved the 
relationship, because it had intensified the technical information flows between the two 
sites and forced more interaction. 
“Because of the T-drug crisis issue, it is an obligation to communicate. 
London was forced to be transparent” (Paris management). “The focus on 
that as a crisis management or a problem management has forced London 
and Paris to work collaboratively” (London management). 
Informants argued that the best way to ensure that regular information sharing was 
maintained over time within the relationship, whether for logistics or for technical 
information, was to formalise the interaction process. 
Because of the fact that the knowledge related to the oncology product line was 
embedded in both the Paris and London sites, there was an opportunity to build synergy 
and develop learning across the two sites, especially to meet the requirements of the 
Mother Plant Programme.  
“We both have history.  We’re going to need to do something to collect all 
that history and share it so that everybody knows where in fact we 
collectively are today”(London management)  
There was agreement that a broader interaction between both sites would benefit the 
TyP⇔L relationship by setting up a network of communication lines across both sites. In 
particular, direct one to one interaction between QA, supply chain and manufacturing, as 
well as ‘technical’ was considered desirable. This was expected to allow increased 
information exchange and knowledge sharing, and improvement in operational co-
ordination through a direct interface for problem solving. Indeed confining 
communication lines at management level tended to restrict information sharing and 
learning. 
There was historically a high people turnover at London. This was disruptive for the 
relationship for three reasons:   
1. It did not allow the benefits of previous socialisation to be reaped and was a barrier to 
networking. We have invested a lot into some people who have gone. Whenever we 
start working well with one individual then he leaves and we have to start from 
scratch (Paris management).  
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2. Established routines were interrupted. It has not been so strong, with the changes that 
have happened since then (London management).  
3. The lack of personal relationship made it more difficult to relate. This de-personalises 
the relationship, so that it is only an administrative one. You tend to have a contact 
only in case of issues and also it makes it more difficult to use the phone to call your 
interface in order to understand what’s going on (Paris management). 
One consequence was that the contact points were not clearly identified, and some 
informants from both plants stated that it was far from clear about who their direct 
interface should be. 
4.3. Co-ordination mechanisms 
Co-ordination of the two supply relationships drew on legal, procedural and logistical 
mechanisms. 
4.3.1. Wheatco⇔Chemco 
Contracts between the two companies clearly positioned the relationship as long term: 
“The contracts that we’ve signed are 20 year type contracts. We’re stuck 
with one another, whether we like it or not.  I think we’re enjoying it” 
(Wheatco Corporate).  
This long-term horizon also resulted from the sunk, non-recoverable investments 
pertaining to the relationship, characterised by the closely linked manufacturing 
processes. There was no unity as to the extent to which the contract was a driver of the 
relationship. However, the general perception was that with such an interdependent 
relationship, it would be difficult and undesirable to attempt to capture all contingencies 
contractually: 
“There are contracts but I think in this relationship it’s a sad day when I 
pull out a contract and read it to my partner at WTC. The contract is just 
a piece of paper we have to write…we can have all the contracts in the 
world, this relationship is so multifaceted that contract or no contract, you 
just have to make it work.” (Chemco corporate).  
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Whilst the contract was viewed as ‘setting the boundaries’ for the local relationship, in 
fact its flexibility was a requirement to allow faster response and more efficient inter-firm 
cooperation. 
The Wh⇔Ch relationship was characterised by a process-centred reciprocal 
interdependence, which resulted in a polarised perspective of the relationship, with 
collaboration and reciprocity at one extreme and a conflict and blame culture on the 
other.  On the other hand, there was a strong perception of the reciprocity that was 
engrained in the awareness of the closely linked production processes. There was an 
immediate impact of one manufacturing unit on the other - due to the lack of buffer stock. 
This generated a view of the relationship as being ‘intense’ (Wheatco engineer) and 
‘intimate’ (Chemco management).  Intensity within the relationship also referred to the 
synchronised adjustment that was required for the operation of the production processes. 
This required systematic communication to allow simultaneous task co-ordination:  
“If we need to change step we have to communicate with them”     
(Chemco operator).  
Co-ordination at process level was mostly by telephone. Problems were perceived as 
being shared, and resolution required joint investigation and co-ordination. Reciprocity 
thus appeared as the only route to shared success, in that co-ordination appeared to be an 
obligation:  
“It’s in everybody’s interest in that circle to work together”          
(Chemco engineering).   
Task interdependence was also seen as a source of conflict. It entailed a frustration, 
which was rooted in process unreliability. Indeed shutdowns involved an underlying fear 
of having to carry the blame for shutting down the whole supply loop, described as: 
“a worried feeling between the two plants that one was going to let the 
other one down” (Chemco operator).  
Periods of process unreliability were viewed as increasing the pressure on the operator: 
“Through a 12 hour shift the feed trips then you put them back on then it 
trips again and it does wear you down if you’re constantly having to start 
the plant up again. When the plant trips, then there are a number of things 
you need to look at…and  to get the whole thing settled down…would take 
quite a few hours.” (Wheatco engineering) 
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In such instances, the downstream party perceived the dependency as not being 
reciprocated, which was interpreted as a feeling of lack of priority.  Lack of 
understanding of what was happening in the other site’s production process created a 
sense of frustration because of the strong interdependence.   
4.3.2. Tyrenco 
Mechanisms that regulated collaborative efforts within the TyP⇔L relationship were 
centred on the co-ordination of D Synth and T-drug. While supply of D-Synth was 
sequential co-ordination, T-drug solution required mutual adjustment, because of the very 
tight time-frame (35 hours) between manufacturing in Paris and the filling operation at 
London.  Co-ordination of the physical product flow was achieved in practice by 
shipment of empty sterile vessels from London. The tight interdependence that 
characterised these operations was viewed as an element of reciprocity as well as a source 
of tension within TyP⇔L.  The relationship was seen as grounded in operational co-
ordination:  
“The partnership is that we send them vessels…they can manufacture into, 
and then they send the vessels back.  I think it is a good working 
relationship where we both understand each others’ needs, and the needs 
meet in the middle with T-drug ending up in London” (London 
engineering) 
This was true for logistics co-ordination as well as for resolution of technical issues. 
Communication was perceived as centred on joint problem resolution: 
“If we have a technical issue that we need to argue, we openly argue but 
it’s a positive argument.  It’s an argument towards a conclusion and 
there’s no hidden agendas... and it interacts in the way it should interact” 
(London management) 
Because of the logistics interdependence, co-ordination was perceived as an 
indispensable characteristic of TyP⇔L to ensure that appropriate product quality, supply 
and regulatory requirements were maintained: 
“If people are working together, and they do not collaborate well, even if 
all procedures are followed, one day or another there could be a mistake 
or a problem with quality or a dysfunction” (Paris management)  
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Causes of frustration between the two sites were at the level of task co-ordination, such as 
quality and availability of the vessels.  The high number of schedule changes and late 
batch cancellations at London impacted on the internal Paris operation.  Numbers of 
operators had to be changed at short notice, which put tension on the internal site 
operation.  
4.4. Joint decision making 
Here, there was often a conflict between local and corporate decision making, in other 
words, the degree to which a plant was free to engage with its supply partner without 
having to refer the issue to corporate levels.  A further problem was the extent to which 
relationship needs prevailed over individual company needs. 
4.4.1. Wheatco-Chemco 
Short-term sacrifice for one of the partners may be necessary to achieve a ‘win-win’ 
situation at the level of the overall relationship.  Reciprocal interdependence encourages 
partners to tolerate short-term inequities. 
“My only very simple vision is: if Chemco and Wheatco were one 
company what actions are the most optimal?” (Chemco corporate).  “Yes 
my counterpart and I have talked about really... we need to make 
decisions as if we were one company.” (Wheatco corporate) 
Some individuals, however, especially those new to the relationship, were struggling to 
accept such a rationale that did not create immediate benefit for their company:  
“When (he) came on board, his question was if we are doing something 
for Wheatco, what’s in it for Chemco?” (Chemco corporate) 
Corporate managers may have been limiting communication about relationship strategy 
by expecting managers to draw on tacit rather than explicit learning modes (see 5.1 
above).  
While joint decision making took place to some extent within teams, details of the action 
planning of relationship operation were determined internally:  
“Then we both come back and separately start to work on it” (Chemco 
management). “Internally we agree how it is we’re going to tackle that, 
how we go about it, who’s going to do what  that sort of thing.  So that’s 
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where the real action, the detailed action plan is laid out” (Wheatco 
management). 
The bounding of local decision-making created frustration in that local management 
perceived themselves closer to the actual issues and therefore better able to make the 
right decisions than ‘the people sitting in America’. This could affect local running of the 
relationship because it became difficult to make timely decisions. Reaction from local 
management was to take action locally and inform corporate after the fact:  
“We have this Wheatco corporate link and then we have this local link 
and I think basically what I’m going to do in the future is make decisions 
and then ask them afterwards because it’s quicker. What I do is go out and 
do it and then what tends to happen is that if I overstep what I’m 
responsible for someone will tell me.”  (Chemco management) “What we 
tend to do is that we will talk to Chemco locally and decide to do 
something and once we’ve done it, we tell the corporate people we’ve 
done it and that way they can’t stop us .” (Wheatco management).  
Thus, collusion at local level was seen as a way to ensure that local priorities were met. 
4.4.2. Tyrenco 
Because the two sites had separate goal setting, the decision making processes were also 
perceived as being separate:  
“Probably more decisions are made individually” (London management)” 
I do not see many joint decisions being made. Independent I think, at the 
moment that is how it is “ (London management). 
Joint decision making was forced at operational level, to co-ordinate production 
schedules between the two sites.  This took place between London planning and the Paris 
T-drug leader: 
“It’s the nitty gritty, looking at the schedule and determining the detail 
between myself and her” (London engineer).  
But the higher-level strategy pertaining to the split of yearly T-drug volumes was not 
clearly articulated. The decision about this split had a big impact on the profitability of 
each site because of the high value of T-drug. Therefore, the split of volumes was at the 
heart of inter-site conflict, and was perceived by both sides as impacting not just the short 
term budget but also the long term survival of each plant.  
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One perceived consequence of the separate site goals within TyP⇔L was that this might 
favour a local vs. an overall Tyrenco perspective. 
“Decisions are made which are not for the benefit of the company” (Paris 
management). “Too focused on their own local needs rather than on 
thinking more globally” (London management) 
There were different interpretations of the ‘mother plant’ concept, and whether it 
involved being a lead site or a coordinating site. This had different implications in terms 
of the approach to decision making, and how much participation was permitted: 
“What is difficult with this relationship is that there is one party, which is 
the order giver and one party, which is the order taker. So therefore there 
is one party, which has more control over the relationship than the other 
one.” (Paris management). 
The perception of asymmetry in TyP⇔L was due to the fact that London was seen as 
having a higher control over the governance of the exchange than Paris, even though 
there was no perceived difference of status between both sites. Indeed T-drug was 
initially developed in Paris, so that this site was seen as having as much technical ability 
and knowledge of the product as London. The imbalance was centred around decision 
making concerning production planning, as well as on the perception of the ‘mother 
plant’ - which was perceived as dominant. However, joint participation in the decision 
making process was justified by the similarity of status and the history of TyP⇔L where 
both sites were contributing equally to the T-drug product. 
“They are two large sites, with similar complementary resources. The 
relationship should not be that London dictates to Paris. It should be a 
more open, mature relationship.” (London management) “There is equal 
experience among the 2 sites so we’re starting from a different starting 
point.  So for London and Paris the mother plant needs to be more of a 
collaborative versus an expert giving support to, you know mother and 
parent child sort of thing.”  (London management) 
Informants saw three pre-requisites for an efficient decision making process to take place 
within TyP⇔L: 
1. Paris people were adamant that there should be clear rules to guide the decision 
making: Rules of the game are clearly stated and accepted by everyone (Paris 
Management).  
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2. Decision making should involve a dialogue: I can’t imagine that it will not be 
accepted bi-laterally.  There should be some kind of negotiation.  
3. Impartiality should guide decision making: Without any favouring of any of the 
parties (Paris management). Work with Paris on that so they believe and London 
believes that the solutions…are the best for the business, taking into account the 
needs of both sites (London management). 
An outcome of negotiation should be a shared ownership of the implementation: 
“There should be shared responsibility and ownership (Paris 
management) So it’s not so much a decision making process because that 
has to happen, but it’s a clarifying what it means and then making it 
happen, so it’s an ownership of the execution” (London corporate).  
“Getting a common view of what is the best business solution and jointly 
agreeing to that and going forward” (London management) 
There was a consensus, across levels and across sites that escalation of the decision 
making process through arbitration should be sought as a conflict resolution mechanism.  
“What would be nice is that a high level person comes to arbitrate.” 
(Paris engineer) “Where there is a disagreement between those 2 you have 
to seek higher resolution.” (London corporate)  
One difficulty was to identify such an arbitrator. Given the existing organisation 
structure, there was no common hierarchical head. The next level at which an impartial 
view could be sought was at Industrial Organisation (IO) level.  
5. Cross-Case Analysis 
We analysed our within-case findings in Table 2 for Wheatco⇔Chemco, and in Table 3 
for Tyrenco Paris⇔London.  The two cases document mutual adjustment in practice, and 
allowed us to highlight three themes that expose the nature of the co-ordination of 
reciprocally interdependent logistics relationships in practice.  
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Table 2: Within-Case Analysis for Wheatco⇔Chemco 
Factor Wheatco⇔Chemco 
Goal 
Congruence  
Strategic goals are “win-win” at corporate manager level. Strategic goals are not 
clear at local level; they are implicit and not articulated by corporate managers 
(stated, unwritten, emergent?).  
Local operational goals are clear and shared: articulated within the management, 
technical and quality teams. Increased formalisation of objectives with the arrival of 
new people perceived as driving more accountability. Disconfirming: Separateness 
and concern for own company benefit is expressed. 
Information 
sharing  
Free and open information sharing. Through information sharing, joint learning can 
take place. Quality issues foster more communication and interaction. Disconfirming: 
Not enough information sharing, maintaining confidentiality. Perception of retention 
of information at corporate level whereas locally there is an obligation to 
communicate, hence potential conflicting messages. Issue with information sharing 
and openness regarding process co-ordination. Limited amount of data transfer (no 
extranet) 
Co-ordination 
mechanisms 
Contractual agreement positions the relationship as long term. No consensus to what 
extent it drives the relationship. It specifies the local team structure. 
Process-centred interdependence with a polarised view.   At one extreme, 
collaboration, embodied in the ‘one plant’ view. Collaboration as an obligation.  At 
the other extreme, frustration around process unreliability and shutdown co-
ordination. Perceived opacity of the other firm’s production process. SOPs are 
separate and not always shared, therefore can be a source of misunderstanding. 
Broad interface across both firms: multiple levels of interaction, mostly functionally 
driven with key points of contact.  
Complexity of the interaction: distortion of the information flows due to a lack of 
formalised communication lines. Call upon hierarchy to validate information content 
seen as disruptive. Tactics for reinforcing the relationship structure: defining a 
communication protocol, single points of contact, appointing dedicated resources. 
Inter-personal relationships are strong. 
Joint decision 
making 
‘One company’ heuristic, but this rationale is foreign for new people. Clarity of 
autonomy of decision making at local level: centred on operational issues. Perceived 
symmetry between the two firms.  Conflict between local decision-making and global 
consistency of business strategy at corporate level. WTC corporate take control over 
business decisions by funnelling through US Manager. Collusion at local 
management level. 
  
Normal script = enabling the relationship, italic = inhibiting the relationship 
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Table 3: Within-case analysis for Tyrenco Paris⇔London 
Factor Tyrenco Paris⇔London 
Goal 
Congruence  
Customer service (C/S) and joint operational co-ordination as shared goal although 
C/S measures different portions of the supply chain. Joint overarching goals: 
Strategic product and cancer application.  No explicit strategic direction for the 
relationship 
No joint operational goals; separate organisation structure. Local site objectives 
(inventory and budget) as source of conflict. Competition around product allocation, 
no win-win. Conflict is covert rather than overt. Market approach to inter-site 
exchanges as ‘jokes, stupid, silly, irrelevant’. Urge for goal setting process: clarity 
and coherence, compatible. SPAN as enabler. Potential joint objectives at global 
level. Product leader as providing alignment for inter-site work. 
Information 
sharing 
Lack of transparency on both sides linked to a lack of interaction: production 
schedules, forecasts and technical data (Paris). Opaque, no sharing of problems. 
Through lack of interaction, no “natural inclination” to communicate (London). 
Focus on own site, organisational separateness. Other barriers to data sharing: no 
enterprise-wide technology, uncertainty of demand information. 
SPAN supports end-to-end visibility and information symmetry (Paris). Product 
community entails a collaborative approach. Joint planning meetings are organised 
beside SPAN. Enhanced collaboration due to T-drug quality issue.,  
Co-ordination 
mechanisms 
Polar view:  reciprocal: Operational co-ordination (‘de facto’ partnership) and 
collaboration around joint technical issues (‘no hidden agenda’). Collaboration as 
indispensable characteristic.  Contract with OC improves clarity and communication  
Polar view: Frustration around task co-ordination and negative impact on both sites 
internal operations and with PM implication for PAR. Lack of yearly production 
programme for T-drug. Competition over the allocation of T-drug. No mechanism to 
encourage inter-site collaboration on PM. 
Past relationship based on single point of contact. Lack of interaction at functional 
level (manufacturing) hence missed opportunities for learning and problem solving. 
Contact points not clearly identified.  
Strong interface defined for SCM (SPAN). Good interpersonal relationships with 
disconfirming data. Interest of broad vs. narrow relationship structure. Desired: 
Identify key contact points. Need to ‘institutionalise’ the interaction so that it does 
not occur only at crisis time. Balanced team structure (number and levels) 
Joint decision 
making 
Joint decision making at operational level but lack of clear strategy for T-drug 
allocation. New framework for decision -making (SPAN and Mother Plant).  
Separate decision-making. Perception of imbalance and asymmetry around decision 
making on T-drug production planning and early understanding of Mother plant 
concept as ‘dominant’.  Recognition of local, parochial rationale vs. ‘overall 
company benefit’. 
Desired: Joint participations in decision making justified by similarity of status and 
equal contribution to T-drug.  Desired: clarity of rules, dialogue and impartiality, to 
allow shared ownership of implementation. Steering committee as forum. 
Arbitration as conflict resolution mechanism. 
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5.1. Mutual adjustment and tension in the relationship 
Relationships have been described as not showing a unitary picture. They involve a 
tension between the need to be close (togetherness) and the need to work separately 
(separateness), as illustrated in figure 4. The presence of this tension was very apparent 
from our data. 
Figure 4: A polar view of supply relationships. 
 
Stresses the benefits of 
working together in the 
supply relationship 
Stresses the negative 
aspects of joint working, 
or the positive benefits of  
working separately. 
 
We concluded that logistical pressures promote togetherness in a relationship, especially 
via procedural mechanisms. If they did not involve contingencies such as product quality 
and process failures, then mutual adjustment would not be necessary. It is the 
contingencies inherent in the management of physical product flows that force mutual 
adjustment and the imperative to work together.  Management of physical flows demand 
heavy-duty co-ordination between supply partners. This can be overlooked by partners 
who tend to focus on the contractual aspects of their relationship, and not on the 
procedural side. 
Mutual adjustment appears as a tension between elements that bring the partners together, 
hence stressing the benefits of achieving shared success, as well as elements that are 
driving them apart.  Separateness can be derived either from a failure to mutually adjust 
(because of various organizational reasons) or as the need to focus on the requirements of 
the internal organization. 
In the context of reciprocally interdependent relationship, interaction takes place at 
multiple levels. Therefore, depending on the levels, the view of the relationship can be 
different. This pertains not only to corporate and local levels, but also within each site - 
Together Separate 
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hence creating a range of layers of interaction. Thus the Wheatco⇔Chemco relationship 
was close at management level, whereas there was a gap at operator level. This supports 
Sobrero and Schrader’s (1998) views about the need for balance and alignment between 
contractual and procedural co-ordination mechanisms. 
5.2.  Mutual adjustment and capability build-up 
The process of mutual adjustment develops new inter-firm procedures and routines and 
hence to new relationship-specific capabilities for both partners. These capabilities are 
invested into the co-ordination of the supply relationship, by for example building up 
joint goals and congruent decision making.  Thus, mutual adjustment is resource 
intensive both in terms of time and personnel, and because the capabilities that are 
created are relationship-specific and cannot easily be redeployed to other relationships.   
Figure 5: Enablers and inhibitors to supply relationships. 
 
Congruent goals Labour turnover 
Shared information Bonus schemes not aligned 
Aligned coordination mechanisms Lack of explicit relationship goals 
Joint decision making Separate decision making 
Resolution of technical problems Opposite behaviour to ‘together’ 
 
This development process is cumulative and long-term in nature, but progress can be 
reversed at any time by the impact of contingencies such as those listed in figure 5.   This 
supports the views of Ring and van de Ven (1992) that membership of collaborations 
tends to be in a constant state of flux with individuals, organizations and their priorities 
rarely remaining stable for more than a few months at a time.  For example, labour 
turnover means that new starts have to be brought up to speed with status of current 
capabilities, and that progress towards togetherness is set back meanwhile.  Resolution of 
technical problems usually promoted togetherness because such problems demanded 
increased co-ordination activity across a broad front.  The togetherness pole is not 
Together Separate 
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invariably the right direction either, because many decisions such as intellectual property 
favour a ‘one plant’ heuristic.  Dynamics of the tension between together and separate 
poles of a reciprocally interdependent logistics relationship mean this is an ongoing 
management task that is not unidirectional in nature.  In practice, the decision is not 
‘either-or’, and managers have to decide how much togetherness to allow, by what means 
it will be administered (for example by setting time aside for group problem solving 
activities, or by using centralised or decentralised mechanisms), and how the results of 
developing togetherness should be measured and rewarded. Huxham and Beech (2003) 
offer supporting advice in that their research provides evidence that raising awareness of 
the types of tension that frequently arise can enhance practitioners’ ability to manage 
them in a considered way in their particular situation.   
5.3.  Implications to the boundaries of the firm  
It was apparent from our studies that firm boundaries tend to be blurred when the 
relationship is ‘together’, in other words there is an area of shared ownership between 
supply partners.   This blurred area shrinks and becomes more formalised and structured 
when the relationship is ‘separate’.  Further, our two cases illustrate that development of 
a more ‘together’ type of relationship is a dynamic process that evolves over time. At 
some periods, partners became preoccupied with their own internal problems, and did not 
have time to devote to the relationship. 
Consideration of what to include within the boundaries of the firm and what to share or 
outsource to the supply partners mirrors the analysis of mutual adjustment in the previous 
section.   Mutual adjustment involves learning and therefore the development of new 
capabilities and new boundaries.   
6. Contribution 
We have organised the contribution of our paper in terms of understanding how 
coordination works in practice in supply relationships at four levels.  First, our study 
explored the multifaceted coordination processes and practices that characterised the 
supply relationship between two large organizations in the inter-firm case, and two parts 
of a single large organization in the intra-firm case.  This revealed the intricate nature of 
such coordination - which involves a large number of daily exchanges between the 
organizations concerned. We looked at multiple levels, and at the different loci of 
interaction (from operator to corporate level) which revealed very different perspectives 
on the relationship. These different strata of interaction were relatively impermeable to 
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each other. Our approach shows a more diverse picture than do studies which focus on 
boundary spanning agents (for example, Marchington and Vincent, 2004).  We used four 
organisational factors to elicit the constructs of coordination and mutual adjustment as 
perceived by the actors tasked with building up the joint routines, processes and 
procedures needed to operate RI relationships.  In both cases, we found situations where 
logistics processes were so interdependent that contingencies in one supply partner 
immediately impacted the other.  Such interdependence was therefore characterised by 
mutual vulnerability and fragility. RI in practice appeared as asymmetrical, fuzzy, 
impermanent and under repeated re-negotiation. The last point echoes the views of 
Berger and Luckmann (1966:167) about ‘reality maintenance’.  Interdependent processes 
have to be the focus of continuous improvement and innovation, which take place at both 
organisational and individual levels.  
Second, at an explanatory level, we found RI relationships contain ‘arm’s length’ as well 
as ‘obligational’ elements (Sako, 1992). Our study highlights the concurrent tension 
between the need to work together and the pressure to be separate. This example of what 
Poole and Van de Ven (1989) refer to as a ‘paradox’ provides an enhanced insight into 
the multifaceted reality of coordination. We found that logistics processes lead to the 
development of relationship-specific capabilities that evolve as a result of coordination 
between partners over time.  Such evolution of joint capabilities is necessary for the 
smooth operation of RI relationships in practice. The dynamics of the tension between 
together and separate poles of an interdependent logistics relationship mean that this is an 
ongoing management task – and that it is reversible in nature.  Capabilities initially built 
up at the start of an RI relationship can reverse over time - for example due to lack of 
priority by either firm or by people turnover.  Coordination has to be re-energised at 
times of crisis when partners are forced to re-invest resources. This extends Feldman and 
Rafaeli’s (2002) view that routines support an organisation’s ability to coordinate and 
adapt by highlighting their role in an inter-organisational context.  
Third, our study has implications for practice. The decision is not ‘either together or 
separate’.  Managers have to decide how much togetherness to allow, by what means it 
will be administered (for example by setting time aside for group problem solving 
activities, and other centralised and decentralised mechanisms), and how the results of 
developing togetherness should be measured and rewarded.  Huxham and Beech (2003) 
offer supporting evidence that raising awareness of the types of tension that frequently 
arise can enhance practitioners’ ability to manage them in a way that is relevant to their 
situation.  The practitioner literature is ‘replete with articles that encourage firms to 
behave as integrated supply chains’ (Swafford et al, 2006:184). Because coordination is 
characterised by ready reversibility and ongoing high investment of resources that are 
needed for maintenance and development, managers should be cautious about adopting 
RI relationships.  It seems to us that the tendency to move to the right in figure 3 cannot 
be eliminated: the tendency to separate will always be there. 
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Finally, our study provides further insights into the under-researched phenomenon of 
intra-firm buyer-supplier relationships. While the intra-firm relationship was subject to 
similar logistical pressures, we found evidence of the difficulty of establishing the 
necessary routines to support inter-site coordination in a context of organizational 
separation and non-aligned incentives.  So the two sites had to compromise, working 
together for the common good of the ‘company’ while being drawn apart by the self-
interest of different reporting relationships and non-aligned incentives.  Further special 
factors like geographical separation and cultural differences between the two plants led us 
to consider that this RI relationship was less well coordinated than the inter-firm case.  
Because we focused on the logistics aspects of dyadic supply relationships, our study did 
not seek to address wider supply chain dimensions, notably in downstream directions. We 
made the assumption that principles from the literature on inter-organizational 
relationships could be applied to intra-firm relationships.  We have focused primarily on 
the logistics-based relationships, and paid little attention to other aspects of relationships 
between firms.  We researched only two such relationships, which makes it more difficult 
to draw general conclusions. This concern is illustrated by the obvious differences 
between the two cases, with the inter-firm case better coordinated than the intra-firm 
case. However, a rich picture can be drawn from comparing such differences: indeed, it 
allowed us to highlight elements of ‘togetherness’, ‘separateness’ and capability build up 
that appeared as inherent features of both relationships.  
In terms of further research, we have focused on coordination of interdependent supply 
relationships.  Our conclusions need to be tested not only in other interdependent supply 
relationships, but also in other aspects of relationships between firms. We have adopted a 
particular view of the supply relationship that is founded on the logistics process and the 
accompanying organizational factors.  More investigation needs to be done about the 
influences of other business functions on the supply relationship. For example, we 
consider that further research is needed to assess the effects of the partners’ internal 
human resource systems on the vulnerability and fragility of interdependent supply 
relationships.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
This interview guide was the result of several iterations; it was originally longer and more 
structured. The reason for starting with broad, open-ended questions (Question 1-3) was to 
encourage the informants to discuss the supply relationship as much as possible without being 
influenced by the researcher. Questions on the constructs derived from the framework for analysis 
were asked later (Question 4). This interview guide was later adapted to run interviews at the 
Tyrenco site. 
The interview generally started with a brief presentation of the research project, credentials of the 
researcher and with a reassurance that the anonymity of the informant would be respected. Then 
the interview proceeded along following lines. 
1. What is your position and role? What are your activities and length in the job, what is your 
reporting line? 
The aim of this question was to allow the informant to briefly introduce himself and his position 
in his organization.  
2. How do you see your role in the supply relationship and how do you interface with the 
partner?  
The aim of this question was to locate the informant within the supply relationship and to 
understand the extent of his interaction with members of the partner organization (Who do you 
interact with? How often? Why? How?). 
3. How would you describe the relationship? (Follow up questions: In what ways is it a 
partnership vs. a non-partnership relationship? What are the elements that reinforce or 
hinder the relationship? Provide specific examples of key events or issues. How have your 
seen the relationship evolve over time?) 
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The aim of this set of open-ended question was to allow the informant to describe the relationship 
in their own words, as much as possible without being influenced by the interviewer. The intent 
was to allow free emergence of various themes about the relationship without constraint from the 
framework for analysis.   
4. What are the requirements of the supply relationship in terms of co-ordination? 
5. How would you specifically describe following factors of the supply relationship? 
The aim of this question was to allow the informants to describe the way they perceived the four 
factors. 
⋅ What can you say about goals within the relationship? (In what ways are goals shared 
or individual? In what ways are they clear or not? In what ways are they explicit or 
not?) 
⋅ What can you say about information sharing within the relationship (extent of and 
quality of the information exchanged)? 
⋅ What can you say about co-ordination mechanisms within the relationship? (Formal 
or informal, contract-related?). 
⋅ What can you say about decision making within the relationship (How clear is the 
decision making process? Are decisions made jointly or separately?)?  
6. Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
